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I. INTRODUCTION

-

We are truly fortunate if we know people who inspire us to author our
lives in a deliberate and meaningful way.1 Professor Clyde Summers is one
of those people for me. So influential has he been on my thinking that there
is probably nothing that I write that does not have a bit of him in it.
Professor Summers began teaching almost seventy years ago, in 1942
only seven years after Congress passed the Wagner Act and five years
before Congress passed Taft-Hartley over President Truman's veto. And
Professor Summers began teaching almost a quarter-century before I was
even born and almost a half-century before I ever met him in law school.
My three years in his company and my interactions with him over the
past twenty years may be just a blink in his academic career. But those
interactions are so inextricably interwoven into the fabric of my intellectual
life that it is hard even for me to know what my legal scholarship would
look like had we never met.
I went to law school to become a criminal trial attorney - my hero was
1. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369-78 (1986); Anne Marie Lofaso,
Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers' Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 U.M.K.C.
L. REv. 1 (2007) (arguing for a human rights theory of the workplace that allows workers to become
part author of their lives).

20 10]

TALKING IS WORTHWHILE

57

Clarence Darrow. But so taken was I with the questions presented in my
basic labor law course that I decided to delve more deeply into the problem
of protecting the individual worker within the collective. 2 As a first-year
law student in the spring of 1989, I applied unsuccessfully to be Professor
Summers' research assistant - a job he understandably gave to a student
with a degree from Cornell's Industrial Labor Relations School. I regularly
attended his office hours, where I learned that Professor Summers was a
great storyteller. During those conversations, he would tell me about how
he worked his way through college, his neighbors hunting in Vermont, or
how his neighbors' cows would eat the grass on his Vermont property so he
did not have to mow the lawn. We talked about his dairy farms, about his
experience as an arbitrator, and how he was able to use the money to put
his children through graduate school. And of course, we talked about the
working class and his latest research projects.
At this point, I couldn't get enough Summers, so the following year
(1989-90), as a second-year law student, I wrote on to the Comparative
Labor Law Journal as an associate editor and enrolled in every upper-level
course he offered, which included a Comparative Labor Law Seminar and
his Employment Law Course, aptly named Legal Protection for the
Individual Employee. And when I turned down the job of Articles Editor
on the Comparative Labor Law Journal, Professor Summers invited me to
become his research assistant, a job I held during my entire third year
(1990-91).
Having spent much of my law school career taking labor law courses
with Professor Summers and thinking about the problems of coercion,
Professor Summers encouraged me to enter the field of comparative labor
law. I wrote my upper-level legal writing requirement on comparative
pregnancy and child care laws in the United States and the European Union
- a paper that both he and Wharton professor, Dr. Janice Bellace,
supervised and a paper that examined the values underlying laws protecting
parents and pregnant women from workplace discrimination. I used that
2. 1 also met that semester and was heavily influenced by Professor C. Edwin Baker, an
academic much of whose life's work is devoted to this problem as well. See generally C. Edwin Baker,
Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L.
REv. 933 (1983); C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First
Amendment, 55 SO. CAL. L. REv. 293 (1982); C. Edwin Baker, The Scope ofFirst Amendment Freedom
ofSpeech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964 (1978). Ed passed away one week after I submitted this article for
publication.
3. Anne Lofaso, Comment, Pregnancy and ParentalCare Policies in the United States and the
European Community: What Do They Tell Us about Underlying Societal Values?, 12 COMP. LAB. L.J.
458 (1991). Dr. Bellace also influenced my thinking on the subject ofjob security. See generally Janice
S. Bellace, Right of FairDismissal:Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 207
(1983); Janice S. Bellace, Employment Protection in the EEC, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 413 (1984).
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paper, with the help of Summers and Bellace, to obtain a fellowship to
complete my doctorate in comparative labor law at Oxford, where I
focused on the problem of mass economic dismissals in the United States
and the European Union and where I worked with, among others, former
Summers student, Dr. Paul Davies.
During my time at Oxford (1992-96), I visited Professor Summers
several times, most notably at his summer home in Vermont. And while
recollections of those visits are sprinkled with the human side of Clyde
Summers - being mothered by his kind and gentle wife, Evelyn, and
meeting one of his daughters and several grandchildren - they are also
firmly grounded in memories of one-on-one conversations or tutorials
about the problem of job security. Clyde - a name I, by-then, awkwardly
used to refer to him - repeatedly told me not to think too much about
theory.4 He said, "Look at the world and you will see that workers care
more about job security than wages."
In those conversations, he explained to me that job security is about
social values and burden sharing - a point he later published in an article
about worker dislocation:
Instability of employment, often in the form of mass dislocation, is a
painful fact of our modem market economy, beyond the reach of any
country to prevent or even influence significantly. Indeed, for a country
to prosper it must embrace and accelerate changes which introduce new
products and increase production. These changes, however, with their
dislocation of workers, inevitably bring substantial personal and social
costs. The costs must be borne either by the workers, the employer, or by
society in general. How we distribute those costs implicitly expresses our
social values, and may in the long run affect our readiness and ability to
absorb those changes rather than to attempt to resist them.s
He also encouraged me to talk to union leaders and working class
folks to understand their concerns. Handing me Richard Trumka's phone
number, he told me to call Trumka, tell him that Clyde had told me to call,
and ask him about union concerns. So I did. And I spent over an hour on
the phone with the future President of the AFL-CIO, telling him about my
doctoral dissertation and chatting about the concerns of the working class
a phone conversation only, but one that has been emblazoned in my

4. Professor Summers often protested theory. But to paraphrase Shakespeare, I think the
professor "doth protest too much" - a point others have observed. For example, in June 2008, at a labor
law dinner at the Law and Society conference in Montreal, James B. Atleson, another one of the big
labor law gurus of the twentieth century, warmly commented to me that Clyde always claimed he did
not like theory but of course he had his own theory of labor law. I concur, and hope that this tribute to
Professor Summers sheds some light on what that theory may have been.
5. Clyde W. Summers, Worker Dislocation: Who Bears the Burden? A Comparative Study, 70
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1033, 1034 (1995).
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memory.
This article then is my tribute to Professor Clyde Summers. It begins
in Part II with our meeting - that blink in his eye that has had such a
profound impact on me. Using personal stories from my interactions with
him, including quotes from my lecture notes, I resurrect that past
relationship to show Professor Summers' influence on my thinking about
job security and comparative labor law. Part III examines domestic and
foreign laws governing job security, focusing on the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act (WARN),6 the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), 7 and the European Union Collective Redundancies
Directive. 8 Part IV argues in favor of borrowing bits of each of those laws
to create a job security policy that requires covered employers to engage in
bargaining upon contemplating employment loss related to a plant closing
or mass layoff. Part V ends this journey with some concluding remarks that
tie my argument back to Professor Summers' inspiring influence over me.
II. THE INFLUENCE OF CLYDE SUMMERS ON MY/OUR THINKING ABOUT
JOB SECURITY

I first met Professor Clyde Summers in January, 1989, when as a
second-semester, first-year law student I was enrolled in his basic labor law
course. 9 On the first day of class, Thursday, January 26, Professor
Summers told the students that he was "very biased" and that he was an
"uncompromising
disciple
of
collective
bargaining." 1 0
After
acknowledging that his bias did not make him pro-union "except when
management tries to destroy unions,"" he went on to ask the following set
of questions:
How do you operate a collective system and preserve the values of
individuals, whose rights and freedoms must be protected? How are you
able, within a collective system, to be a liberal - to recognize the rights
of individuals? 12

6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (2006).
7. 29 U.S.C.§§ 151-69 (2006).
8. Council Directive 75/129, 1975 O.J. (L 048) 29-30 (EEC), amended by Council Directive
92/56, 1992 O.J. (L 245) 3-5 (EC), as consolidated by Council Directive 98/59, 1998 O.J. (L 225) 1621 (EU) [hereinafter Collective Redundancies Directive].
9. At the time, the University of Pennsylvania Law School required labor law in the second
semester of the first year to fulfill the administrative law requirement. Professor Summers taught half
the I L class and Professor Robert Gorman taught the other half of the IL class.
10. Lofaso Lecture Notes, Labor Law, Professor Summers, at Jan. 26, 1989 [hereinafter Lofaso
Lecture Notes] (on file with author).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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Professor Summers then proceeded to examine the other half of this
equation - the employer. In Summers' view:
Employers are collectivists epitomized because they take workers and
say "follow or out." Employers are sometimes benign and sometimes not
benign authoritarians. [So the question becomes,] how do you preserve,
protect, encourage individual rights in a collective society? This is the
fundamental problem of government.
It was probably with this question that I became hooked on labor law
as a discipline worthy of serious scholarly study. I knew, then and there,
that the workplace defined us as both economic beings and as human
beings with individual rights. And I knew, then and there, that those two
viewpoints would clash over and over again, especially at the point of
employment termination. And so, I became particularly interested in what
Professor Summers had to say about job security.
Throughout the semester, Professor Summers used example after
example to show the extent to which federal labor law did little to protect
job security. On January 31, in discussing NLRB v. Mackay Radio
Telegraph Co.,1 4 and then American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB,15
Summers criticized the extent to which the Supreme Court had weakened
the position of the more vulnerable party. Starting with the premise that a
main purpose of the NLRA is to equalize the disparity of bargaining power
between labor and management, Summers demonstrated that the Court in
Mackay Radio provided the wrong incentives. By allowing employers to
permanently replace economic strikers, the Mackay Radio rule further
weakens unions that are already vulnerable. Summers' preferred solution:
If collective bargaining fails, then business should close and "see who gets
hungry first." 16 Similarly, in Summers' view, allowing employers to
lockout their workers only tends to equalize bargaining power in cases
where the union is already very strong. But once again, the Court in
American Ship Building got the incentives wrong when it allowed the
employer to select the timing of the shutdown in circumstances where the
union was weak during the summer but strong during the winter. 17
The following week, in the context of discussing FibreboardPaper
Products Corp. v. NLRB,' 8 and the question whether "contracting out" is a
mandatory subject of bargaining, Professor Summers commented that

13. Id.
14.

304 U.S. 333 (1938).

15. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
16. Lofaso Lecture Notes, supra note 10, at Jan. 31, 1989.
17. Id.
18. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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subcontracting is "akin to discharge." 1 9 Like the Supreme Court,20
Summers places subcontracting within the plain language of Section 8(d),
which obligates the parties to bargain collectively over "terms and
conditions of employment."
The duty to bargain does not prevent management from ultimately
making the decision; if the parties bargain to impasse, then management
may take unilateral action. But given Summers' view of the Wagner Act, a
view that values bargaining, it is little wonder that Summers viewed the
boundary that separates mandatory from nonmandatory bargaining subjects
- a line created by those decisions that "lie at the core of entrepreneurial
control" 22 - as a line that fails to promote industrial peace and therefore
fails to promote the free, albeit collective, labor market.
Professor Summers also had high regard for the role of the employee
representative. In the context of discussing NLRB v. Crompton-Highland
Mills, 2 3 where the Supreme Court held that an employer violates the Act
when, after negotiating with the union and declaring impasse, it effectuates
a substantially greater general wage increase applicable to most of the
bargaining unit employees than any wage increase offered during
bargaining, 24 Summers discussed the importance of the union as "the voice
of the employees." 25 He explained that in this case "the employer was
trying to discredit the union in the eyes of the employees (you'd do better
without a union), so that the employees would abandon the union."26 For
Summers, "the duty to bargain is based on the assumption that talking is
worthwhile" even if it results in impasse because talking empowers
workers by taking power away from the employer. 2 7 By forcing employers
to discuss mandatory subjects of bargaining with the union, the "employer
has to sit down with employees . . . [and] bargain in good faith." 28 In such

19. Lofaso Lecture Notes, supra note 10, at Feb. 7, 1989.
20. See FibreboardPaper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. at 210 (placing the "contracting out of plant
maintenance work previously performed by employees in the bargaining unit [and) which the
employees were capable of continuing to perform" as "well within the literal meaning of the phrase
'terms and conditions of employment"'); see also id. ("The words even more plainly cover termination
of employment which . . necessarily results from the contracting out of work performed by members
of the established bargaining unit.").
21. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
22. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 498 (1979); FibreboardPaper Prods. Corp., 379
U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
23. 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
24. Id. at 223.
25. Lofaso Lecture Notes, supra note 10, at Jan. 31, 1989.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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cases, the "employer cannot take unilateral action without discussing [the
subject] with the union to impasse. If there is no agreement, then [the
matter will be] resolved by economic force." 2 9
In this same dialogue, Professor Summers discussed the role of the
employer's duty to furnish relevant information. He explained that the duty
to furnish relevant information is important "to make discussion
meaningful." 30 Professor Summers recounted the story of how General
Motors and Ford once used financial information to persuade their unions
that the American car industry could not compete with the Japanese car
industry. That information exchange helped to explain the automobile
companies' negotiating posture, which eventually led to union givebacks
and perhaps saved the American auto industry, at least for the time being.31
Professor Summers, whose focus was always the individual, also
showed concern about other sources of coercion (including government and
unions). For Professor Summers, the Wagner Act was a free market
solution to a free market problem. 3 2 "Free" collective bargaining is
necessary to make that "market function as a market." 3 3 Government
regulation must be kept to a minimum by permitting the parties to negotiate
solutions to industrial problems. "The law intervenes only to provide
minimum structure and process." 34 This process must, however, be
democratic. The union is the exclusive representative kept in check by the
duty of fair representation.35
III. LAWS PROTECTING JOB SECURITY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

A. The Employment At- Will PresumptionIs the Dominant DefaultRule; Its
Main Exceptions Can Be Viewed as PlacingLimits on Employer Privilege
to DischargeEmployees for Bad Reasons
In the United States, the dominant default job security rule is governed
by state law: employers generally may fire their employees for any reason,

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Lofaso Lecture Notes, supra note 10, at Mar. 2, 1989.

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. During this time, Professor Summers was thinking very seriously about the role of minority
unions. But his views, which he has published, were shared with me not as his student but later on as his
research assistant. See Clyde Summers, Unions Without Majority - A Black Hole?, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 531 (1990).
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good or bad, or for no reason at all.36 The rule is the starting presumption in
every state except Montana, which requires private-sector employers to
have just cause to discharge their employees. 37 As Professor Summers has
explained, the "United States, unlike almost every other industrialized
country and many developing countries, has neither adopted through the
common law or by statute a general protection against unfair dismissal or
discharge without just cause, nor even any period of notice." 38
The employment at-will doctrine gives employers broad discretion to
terminate the employment relationship unless the law has carved out a
particular exception. 39 Because the employment at-will doctrine is the
creature of state law, the basic exceptions to at-will employment are
themselves state created - either by the state's court of last resort or by the
state's legislative body. 40 The federal government has also put limits on an
36. See, e.g., Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 1884 WL 469, *5 (1884)
(observing that "[i]f the service is terminable at the option of either party, it is plain no action would lie
even to the employe[e]; for either party may terminate the service, for any cause, good or bad, or
without cause, and the other cannot complain in law"), overruled on other grounds by Hutton v. Walter,
179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915); see Payne Western, 1884 WL 469, at *6 ("[M]en must be left ... to
discharge or retain employe[e]s at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause without
thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se"). See generally Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will
in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65 (2000). For a
current, in-depth review of the at-will doctrine, see Barry D. Roseman, Just Cause in Montana: Did the
Big Sky Fall? (Am. Const. Soc'y for L. & Pol'y Issue Brief, 2008), available at <http://www.acslaw.
org/files/Roseman% 20Issue%2OBrief O.pdf>.
37. Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914
(2009). Statutes in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands also require just cause for employment
termination. See also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 185a-m (2009); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 76-79

(2009).
38. Summers, supra note 36, at 65. The lack of a more coherent employment termination statute
has been observed by several labor and employment law academics. See, e.g., Robert M. Bastress, A
Synthesis and a Proposalfor Reform of the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 90 W. VA. L. REv. 319, 346
(1988) (advancing "an alternative system, analogous to arbitration in the collective bargaining context"
that would give employees "a cause of action sounding in tort, complete with the full range of legal and
equitable remedies, for any discharge accomplished without just cause"); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of
Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89 (2008) (advocating a universal law of
termination under federal law); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at
Will (unpublished manuscript forthcoming 2010), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid= 1551522> (advocating for a universal statutory notice requirement).
39. Professor Bastress views the erosions to the at-will doctrine as "squares [on a Bingo board]
that could provide relief." Bastress, supra note 38, at 320.
40. There are four main exceptions to the at-will doctrine. First, employees may expressly contract
around the at-will rule. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 884
(Mich. 1980) (permitting a cause of action for wrongful discharge based on an oral contract); Guiliano
v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 91-92, 95-96 (Tenn. 1999) (finding written contract protecting employee
against just cause dismissal for three-year term embodied in letter the company President and Chief
Executive Officer sent to employee)). Second, many states permit employees to establish a wrongful
discharge claim through implied contract. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct.
App. 1981) (permitting employee to present entire course of dealings between employer and employee,
and longevity of service in particular, to establish an implied contract of employment); Goff-Hamel v.
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, P.C., 588 N.W.2d 798 (Neb. 1999) (permitting employee to use a
promissory estoppel theory of the case to establish an implied contract); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La
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employer's authority to fire at will. For example, under the NLRA,
employers may not fire employees to encourage or discourage union
activity.41 Nor may employers fire employees, under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, because of their "race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."42
Many of these exceptions can be viewed as an attempt by the
government to insert some fairness into the employment termination
process. For example, we might think of the handbook cases (cases where
courts have held employers to promises of job security found in
employment manuals) as the law's way of holding employers to promises
of job security as expressed in the employment manual.43 And we might
think of the discrimination cases as the law's way of forbidding employers
from discharging employees for reasons that we as a society view as
particularly bad -because of, for example, that employee's "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 4 4
Notwithstanding these erosions to the at-will doctrine, many
employers may still discharge employees for arbitrary reasons. For
example, at-will states do not prohibit employers from firing employees
simply because they have red hair.4 5 In West Virginia, a state judge
apparently may lawfully fire his magistrate court clerk because the clerk's

Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985) (permitting employee to present employment handbook to show
that the employer breached an implied contractual term). Third, some states will read into the at-will
employment relationship an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., Fortune v. Nat'l
Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1971). See generally Susan Dana, The Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing: A Concentrated Effort to Clarify the Imprecision of Its Applicability in
Employment Law, 5 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 291 (2004). Fourth, the majority of states permit
a public policy exception to employment at-will. See, e.g., Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc., 541 S.E.2d
616 (W.Va. 2000). For an excellent summary of these exceptions, see Charles J. Muhl, The
Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 2001, at 3
(discussing the later implied contracts; covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and public policy
exceptions), available at <http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/01/art1full.pdf>.
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (2006). The Board first articulated its current discrimination
doctrine in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981). The
Supreme Court approved of that doctrine in NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
43. See, e.g., Hoffinann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d at 1257 (permitting employee to present
employment handbook to show that the employer breached an implied contractual term).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
45. As a practical matter, a profit-minded, rational employer would only fire employees for having
red hair if there were some relevant correlation between red hair and job performance or if the
employer's customers reduced their expenditures in the employer's business because of the employee's
red hair. Of course, not all employers are rational. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, A
Near-RationalModel of the Business Cycle, with Wage and Price Inertia, 100 Q. J. EcON. 823, 825
(1985) (arguing that individuals engage in near-rational behavior or "behavior that is perhaps
suboptimal but that nevertheless imposes very small individual losses on its practitioners relative to the
consequences of their first-best policy").
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son decided to run for public office.4 6
These cases may seem outrageous to some. By contrast, a staunch atwill proponent would likely advocate for letting the market, rather than the
law, punish the employer.47 Where the employer gets away with its
conduct, in cases where the market does not punish the arbitrary employer,
the at-will proponent might merely view the discharged person as collateral
damage. I do not agree with that view, but the question that I have found
even more fascinating, a feeling that has only grown since my time as a
doctoral student, is a much closer question - what happens when there is no
bad guy in the picture? What happens when an employer discharges an
employee not for misconduct but for economic reasons?
B. Through No Fault of Their Own
1. Overview
In this section, I examine the question of what happens when
employers, through no fault of their own, must discharge employees for
economic reasons? This is the situation that occurs, for example, during
economic recessions, bankruptcies, and lulls in the business cycle. These
situations present cases where neither the employer nor the employee has
engaged in any misconduct. Instead, both employer and employee may
even have hoped to maintain an employment relationship but cannot on
account of reasons beyond the control of both parties.
These circumstances naturally lead to the following question for
workplace law professors and policy makers: What is the law's role in
protecting individual workers who are economically harmed in these
circumstances? From the workers' viewpoint, the law may protect many

46. Smith v. Frye, 488 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2007). Government employers are not motivated by
profits in the traditional sense. Government bureaucrats instead make decisions based upon "salary,
perquisities of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, ease of managing the bureau, and ease of
making changes." William A. Niskanen, The PeculiarEconomics of Bureaucracy, 58 AM. EcON. REV.
293, 293-94 (1968). This may explain the seeming arbitrariness of Smith and suggests perhaps an
additional reason for why the at-will doctrine is particularly inappropriate in such workplaces.
47. For example, Richard Epstein has written,
The employer who decides to act for bad reason or no reason at all may not face any legal
liability under the classical common law rule. But he faces very powerful adverse economic
consequences. If coworkers perceive the dismissal as arbitrary, they will take fresh stock of
their own prospects, for they can no longer be certain that their faithful performance will
ensure their security and advancement. The uncertain prospects created by arbitrary employer
behavior is functionally indistinguishable from a reduction in wages unilaterally imposed by
the employer. At the margin some workers will look elsewhere, and typically the best workers
will have the greatest opportunities.
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contractat Will, 51 U. CHi. L. REv. 947, 968 (1984).
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things, most of which can be classified as post-termination or pretermination policies. Below, I touch upon what post-termination solutions
might look like before focusing on the primary subject of this paper - pretermination solutions to the problem of economic job loss.
2. Post-Termination Solutions: Substitute Jobs or Income Replacement?
On the post-termination-side, aside from doing nothing (letting the
free market work itself out), policymakers may choose to intervene to
protect the worker's income stream in one of at least three ways. First, the
law could encourage entrepreneurship by providing, among other things,
tax credits or some other subsidy to nascent businesses. For example, the
state of West Virginia encourages entrepreneurship by giving free legal
counsel to emerging businesses in the state. The West Virginia University
College of Law Entrepreneurship Law Clinic makes it less costly for startup companies to incorporate and operate, which should have some effect
on unemployment.4 8 Second, the law could provide alternative work for the
unemployed. This solution would likely be coupled with job training,
retraining, and cross-training. Third, the law could provide some form of
economic benefit unattached to work.
The second solution, providing work for the displaced worker, has not
found widespread support as a legal or economic policy in the United
States. As a threshold matter, the United States does not, as a matter of
federal policy or the policy of any individual state, guarantee full
employment.49 There is no constitutional or statutory right to work, let
alone a right to work at the job of an employee's choice. 50 Nor has the
48. For a description of the Entrepreneurship Clinic, see <http://law.wvu.edu/public service/elc>.
These corporate solutions are an important part of the dialogue but are well beyond the scope of this
paper, which focuses on labor and employment law policies.
49. Indeed, the United States does not even guarantee full employment in the economic sense. In
particular, it is not a matter of national economic policy to equate actual unemployment to the natural
rate of unemployment. See Robert J. Gordon, The Time-Varying NAIRU and its Implications for
Economic Policy, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1997, at 11, 15; see also Robert E. Hall et al., Why Is the
Unemployment Rate So High at Full Employment 1970 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 369,
370 (citing Milton Friedman, The Role of Monetary Policy, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1968) and Edmund
S. Phelps, The New Microeconomics in Inflation and Employment Theory, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 147

(1969)).
50. By contrast, Italy "recognizes the right of all citizens to work." CONST. [Constitution] art. IV,
cited in INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS 6-1 (William L. Keller & Timothy J. Darby
eds., 3d ed. 2009); see also Int'l Labour Org. (ILO) Constitution, Declaration Concerning the Aims and
Purposes of the International Labour Organization, art. III, May 10, 1944, 49 Stat. 2712, 15 U.N.T.S. 35
(Annex to ILO Constitution) (reaffirming the fundamental principle that I(a) "labour is not a
commodity"; and recognizing the solemn obligation of the organization to further programs that will
achieve III (a) "full employment and the raising of standards of living"; III(b) "the employment of
workers in the occupations in which they can have the satisfaction of giving the fullest measure of their
skill and attainments and make their greatest contribution to the common well-being"; and 111(d)
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United States established a labor policy of forcing employers to maintain
jobs 5 1 - a strategy that is seemingly incompatible with the values of a
capitalist-based economy.52
Nor has the United States typically chosen to protect its workers'
income streams by providing either redundant or displaced workers with
substitute jobs.13 A weaker form of this right would provide (pre- or posttermination) cross-training opportunities for workers so that a worker has a
better chance of finding another job on his or her own because he or she
has a more diverse package of skills to offer potential employers.
But the United States has not altogether ignored the problems created
by job loss. It has instead focused on the third solution - providing
unemployment benefits. In particular, by enacting the Social Security Act
of 1935,54 Congress has instead established legislation that focuses
primarily on providing a safety net for workers who, through no fault of
their own, have lost their jobs. This safety net, which is typically cast by
the states, includes unemployment compensation for laid-off workers. The
federal government encourages the states to provide this net through a

.

-policies in regard to wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of work calculated to ensure a just
share of the fruits of progress to all, and a minimum living wage to all employed and in need of such
protection").
51. But see David I. Levine, Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse
Selection, 9 J. LAB. ECON. 294 (1991) (arguing that government-mandated just-cause employment
policy would increase efficiency so long as that policy is implemented as a matter of national
employment policy).
52. In the view of many law and economics academics, forcing an employer to maintain jobs
regardless of the employer's interests violates basic free market principles by taking away both the
employer's and the employee's freedom to enter an at-will employment relationship. Epstein, supra
note 47. Mainstream neoclassical economists seem to agree with this assessment. For example,
according to Milton Friedman,
[t]he possibility of co-ordination through voluntary co-operation rests on the
elementary - yet frequently denied - proposition that both parties to an economic
transaction benefit from it, provided that the transaction is bi-laterally voluntary
and informed. Exchange can therefore bring about co-ordination without coercion.
A working model of a society organized through voluntary exchange is a free
enterprise exchange economy - what we have been calling competitive capitalism.
. . [C]o-operation is strictly individual and voluntary provided: (a) that enterprises
are private, so that the ultimate contracting parties are individuals and (b) that
individuals are effectively free to enter or not to enter into any particular exchange,
so that every transaction is strictly voluntary.
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, 13-14 (University of Chicago Press 1982) (1962)
(emphasis in original). But see Lofaso, supra note 1, at 4-31 (criticizing this view in part).
53. Although the United States has not resorted to such a policy as standard operating policy, it
has resorted to such a policy during grave economic circumstances. For example, in 1933, Congress
established, as part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal policy, the Civilian Conservation
Corps (CCC), a public work relief program to provide vocational training for unemployed young men.
CCC Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-163, 50 Stat. 319 (1937).
54. The original Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), has been
significantly amended. A thorough discussion of the United States social security system is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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system of tax incentives.55 In addition to establishing programs for the
unemployed,5 6 Congress has also established social security programs for
the elderly,5 7 for needy families with children (along with other child
welfare programs), 5 for veterans, 5 9 for the aged, blind and disabled,6 0 and
61
other programs.
3. Pre-Termination Solutions: Information, Bargaining and Consultation
Rights
a. Overview: Alternatives to At-Will Employment
On the pre-termination side, aside from setting up a default rule
making it legally easy for employers to terminate employees for any
reason, including economic reasons (e.g., the at-will employment doctrine),
policymakers may choose to intervene to help workers who are in danger
of losing their jobs in at least five ways. First, the law could compel
employers to provide workers with notice of job loss. Second, the law
could require employers to provide workers with information relevant to
understanding the possibility of job loss. Third, the law could also compel
employers to consult with workers or their representatives about the
decision to terminate those workers. Fourth, the law could compel
employers to bargain with workers either before deciding to terminate
those workers or about the effects of the decision to terminate workers.
And finally, the law could require employers and workers to work together
to determine how best to resolve issues of job security. The type of
procedural roles for the law can be mapped as follows:

55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 901-13 (2006) (establishing the federal Social Security Administration); 42
U.S.C. §§ 1101-10 (2006) (employment security provisions); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1321-24 (2006) (advances to
state unemployment funds). A thorough discussion of the federal-state unemployment insurance
program is beyond the scope of this paper.
56. See generally 42 U.S.C. §@ 501-04 (2006) (unemployment compensation).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (2006) (old-age benefits); 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34 (2006) (old-age trust
funds).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-29, 651 (2006) (needy families with children and child welfare); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 701-10 (2006) (maternal and child health services grant); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-97jj (2006)
(children's health insurance).
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1001-13 (2006) (veterans' benefits).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-06 (2006) (state grants for aid to the blind); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 note-85
note (2006) (grants to states for aid to the aged, blind, or disabled); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-55 (2006) (grants
to states for aid to the permanently or totally disabled); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83f (2006) (supplemental
security income for the aged, blind or disabled); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to 1395b-10 (2006) (health
insurance for the aged and disabled).
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1391-94 (2006) (grants for planning comprehensive action to combat mental
retardation); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 to 1396w-1 (2006) (medical assistance programs); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397to 1397f (2006) (grants to states for social services).
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In the United States, these rights can be found in two sources of law. First,
federal law (and in some cases state law) requires employers to provide
advance notice of certain mass economic dismissals.6 3 Second, labor law
statutes impose on employers a duty to bargain and a duty to furnish
relevant information.6 4 I look to the European Union to discuss the idea of
pre-decisional consultation.6 5 The discussion below is organized
accordingly.
b. Notice and the WARN Act
In 1988, Congress passed the WARN Act, a law that became effective
on February 4, 1989.66 The purpose of the WARN Act is to
protect[] . . . workers, their families and communities by requiring
employers to provide notification 60 calendar days in advance of plant
closings and mass layoffs. . . . WARN also provides for notice to State
dislocated worker units so that dislocated worker assistance can be
promptly provided.67
62. Oxford Professor Mark Freedland used a similar rubric in discussing these ideas in his
graduate law course, International Labor and Employment Law, which he co-taught with Professors
Paul Davies and Sandra Fredman during the mid-1990s.
63. The federal law is known as the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the
WARN Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (2006). See discussion in Part III.B.3.b. Many individual states
have also legislative state WARN acts (known as "mini" WARN Acts) that typically cover more
workers than does the federal WARN Act. See, e.g., California, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1400-08 (West
2009); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-51n to 31-510 (2009); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, § 625-B (2009); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151A, §§ 71A-71F (2009); Michigan, MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 450.731-450.738 (2009); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40 (2009); and
Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. § 109.07 (2009). New Hampshire recently enacted the New Hampshire Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (N.H. WARN Act), effective January 1, 2010, N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§275-F:1 to 275-F:12 (2009), summary available at <http://www.labor.state.nh.us/
WarnAct_Summary.pdf>.
64. The relevant laws here are the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) and
(5) (2006), and the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (2006). This article focuses on the
duty to bargain under the NLRA.
65. Collective Redundancies Directive, supra note 8.
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (2006). For an excellent discussion of the WARN Act, see ArnowRichman, supra note 38. In that article, Professor Arnow-Richman recommends universal notice,
among other things. And, like my recommendation, she would broadly extend the notice requirement to
encompass more workers.
67. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (2009).

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

70

[Vol. 14:55

At the time, the WARN Act was viewed as a "compromise between
the workers' need for advance notice and the concerns of business." 68 On
the one hand, policymakers recognized that "workers and their families
[needed] some transition time to adjust to the prospective loss of
employment, to seek and obtain alternative jobs and, if necessary, to enter
skill training or retraining that will allow these workers to successfully
compete in the job market." 6 9 Indeed, by requiring that notice be given not
only to affected employees or their representatives but also to the state
dislocated worker unit, "WARN notice begins the process of assisting
workers who will be dislocated," by "encourag[ing] maximum coordination
of the actions and activities of [the federal programs designed to assist
dislocated workers] to assure that the negative impact of dislocation on
workers is lessened to the extent possible."7 0 On the other hand, employers
were concerned that "providing advance notice would be costly" - a
concern that has not bome fruit.7 1
The WARN Act provides a narrow claim-right to workers by placing a
statutory duty on covered employers to provide written notice at least sixty
days in advance of a plant closing or mass layoff. In particular, the WARN
Act forbids statutory employers from "order[ing] a plant closing or mass
layoff until the end of a 60-day period after the employer serves written
notice of such an order." 7 2 Under the WARN Act, employers must notify
each affected statutory employee (or his/her representative); the State
dislocated worker unit; and the local government where the plant is
located.73
The WARN Act confers a fairly narrow statutory right on workers.7 4

68.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING

OFFICE, DISLOCATED WORKERS:

WORKER ADJUSTMENT

AND

RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT NOT MEETING ITS GOALS 13 (1993), available at <http://archive.
gao.gov/d44tl5/148916.pdf>.
69. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (2009).
70. Id. at (f). For example, the Department of Labor administers the Trade Adjustment Assistance
Program (TAA), a federal program established by the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2479b
(2006), which helps workers who have lost their jobs as a result of foreign trade. The Department of
Labor also administers the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance (EDWAA)
Program, a federal program established through the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-300, 96 Stat. 1322, that provides occupational training, placement assistance, job search services, job
counseling, remedial education, relocation allowances, and other support services to dislocated workers.
71. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 68, at 6, 33.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2006).
73. 20 C.F.R. § 639.6 (2009). The statute provides that the employer must provide written notice
(1) to each representative of the affected employees as of the time of the notice or,
if there is no such representative at that time, to each affected employee; and (2) to
the State dislocated worker unit . . . and the chief elected official of the unit of local
government within which such closing or layoff is to occur.
29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2006).
74. See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1995) (providing a fairly concise
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As a threshold matter, the employer's duty to notify is limited to the
following circumstances. First, that duty is placed only on employers who
have 100 or more full-time workers.7 5 And the duty to provide notice is
potentially triggered in only two circumstances: a plant closing76 and a
mass layoff.77 Based on these statutory definitions, the following
businesses potentially have obligations under the WARN Act: (1)
businesses that employ 100 or more full-time workers that effectuate a
plant closing resulting in the layoff of at least fifty full-time workers; and
(2) businesses that employ 100 or more workers that effectuate a reduction
in force of at least one-third of the workforce (for businesses laying off
fewer than 500 workers) or for a total of 500 workers.
The WARN Act only protects statutory employees who have suffered
an "employment loss," which the Act defines as "(A) an employment
termination, other than a discharge for cause, voluntary departure, or
retirement, (B) a layoff exceeding 6 months, or (C) a reduction in hours of
work of more than 50 percent during each month of any 6-month period." 7 9
Temporary layoffs of less than six months and work hours reductions of
not more than 50 percent of hours worked do not constitute an employment

loss.80
description of the covered employer's duties under the WARN Act by way of background and in the
context of holding that state law provides the limitations period for civil actions brought to enforce the
WARN Act).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a) (2009).
76. The WARN Act defines a plant closing as
the permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or
more facilities or operating units within a single site of employment, if the
shutdown results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any
30-day period for 50 or more employees excluding part-time employees.
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(b) (2009).
77. The WARN Act defines a mass layoff as
a reduction in force which(A) is not the result of a plant closing; and
(B) results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30day period for
(i) (I) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-time
employees); and
(II) at least 50 employees (excluding any part-time employees); or
(ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time employees).
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(c) (2009).
78. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING
NOTIFICATION ACT: REVISING THE ACT AND EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS COULD CLARIFY EMPLOYER

RESPONSIBILITIES AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 6 (2003), available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d031003.pdf>. The number of terminations is legally significant. E.g., Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers Int'l Union, Local 7-629 v. RMI Titanium Co., 199 F.3d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding no
WARN Act liability as a matter of law where employer laid off two workers shy of the "number
necessary to make this action a mass layoff').
79. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(f) (2009).
80. But see 29 U.S.C. § 2101(b) (2006) (excluding various circumstances from the definition of
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There are also many exceptions to what constitutes an employment
loss. Perhaps the most troublesome exception (from the employee's point
of view) is the transfer exception. Under this regulation, an employee who
loses his or her job because he or she refuses to accept a transfer within a
reasonable commuting distance does not suffer an employment loss for
purposes of the WARN Act. 8 1
The extent to which the WARN Act buys into a unitary system of
industrial relations - a system of industrial relations in which the employer
is the main, if not sole, authority of workplace decision-making - is made
clear not only by the narrow claim-right conferred by the Act but also by its
exceptions. In particular, the WARN Act "sets forth three conditions under
which the notification period may be reduced to less than 60 days:" 8 2 (1)
the unforeseeable business circumstances exception; 83 (2) the faltering
company exception; 84 and (3) the natural disaster exception.
Under the unforeseeable business circumstances exception, "[a]n
employer may order a plant closing or mass layoff before the conclusion of
the 60-day period if the closing or mass layoff is caused by business
circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable as of the time that
notice would have been required." 86 To satisfy its burden, the employer
must establish that (1) the circumstance was unforeseeable and (2) the
layoffs were caused by the circumstance.
The Department of Labor has promulgated regulations clarifying that
an "important indicator of a business circumstance that is not reasonably
foreseeable is that the circumstance is caused by some sudden, dramatic,
and unexpected action or condition outside the employer's control."8 In
employment loss); Wiltz v. M/G Transp. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 957, 964-65 (6th Cir. 1997) (interpreting
Section 2101(b) as providing that the sale of a business does not trigger WARN notice obligations);
int'l Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees v. Compact Video Servs., Inc., 50 F.3d 1464, 1467 (9th
Cir. 1995); Headrick v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1280 (10th Cir 1994) (observing that under
Section 2101(b)(1), "employees transferred from one company to another because of a sale simply are
not to be held by any court to have suffered a remediable 'employment loss"').
81. 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(f)(3)(i) (2009).
82. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9 (2009); see 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b) (2006); In re APA Transp. Corp. Consol.
Litig., 541 F.3d 233, 240, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2008). The WARN Act also authorizes courts, in their
discretion, to "reduce the amount of the liability or penalty" where "an employer which has violated this
chapter proves to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission that violated this chapter was in
good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a
violation of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(4) (2006).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(A) (2006).
84. Id. at (b)(1).
85. Id. at (b)(2)(B).
86. Id. at (b)(2)(A).
87. See, e.g., Gross v. Hale-Halsell Co., 554 F.3d 870, 875 (10th Cir. 2009); Roquet v. Arthur
Andersen LLP, 398 F.3d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 2005).
88. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b)(1) (2009).
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the right circumstances, examples of such an action or condition might
include the "unexpected termination of a major contract with the employer,
a strike at a major supplier of the employer, and an unanticipated and
dramatic major economic downturn." 89 The regulations further instruct that
the test for foreseeability "focuses on an employer's business judgment.
The employer must exercise such commercially reasonable business
judgment as would a similarly situated employer in predicting the demands
of its particular market." 90 But the WARN Act does not require the
employer to be able "to accurately predict general economic conditions that
also may affect demand for its product or services." 9
The faltering company exception applies only to plant closings. 9 2
Under that exception, 9 3 an employer may order a plant closing before the
conclusion of the sixty-day period, thereby reducing the notice to
employees where (1) the employer was actively seeking capital at the time
that sixty-day notice would have been required; (2) there was a realistic
opportunity to obtain the financing sought; (3) the financing would have
been sufficient, if obtained, to enable the employer to keep the facility open
for a reasonable period of time; and (4) "the employer reasonably and in
good faith . . . believed that giving the required notice would have
precluded the employer from obtaining the needed capital or business." 9 4
Under the natural disaster exception, "[n]o notice . . . shall be required
if the plant closing or mass layoff is due to any form of natural disaster,
such as a flood, earthquake, or the drought currently raving the farmlands
of the United States." 95 "To qualify for this exception, an employer must be
able to demonstrate that its plant closing or mass layoff is a direct result of
a natural disaster." 9 6

89. Id.
90. Id. at (b)(2).
91. Id.
92. Id. at (a).
93. The full text of the exception is as follows:
An employer may order the shutdown of a single site of employment before the conclusion of
the 60-day period if as of the time that notice would have been required the employer was
actively seeking capital or business which, if obtained, would have enabled the employer to
avoid or postpone the shutdown and the employer reasonably and in good faith believed that
giving the notice required would have precluded the employer from obtaining the needed
capital or business.
29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(1) (2006).
94. Childress v. Darby Lumber, Inc., 357 F.3d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 639.9(a)(4) (2003)); see id. (finding that the company failed to qualify for the faltering company
exception because it failed to produce evidence that giving notice would have precluded the company
from obtaining credit from the bank).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(B) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(c)(1) (2009).
96. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(c)(2) (2009).
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These three conditions or exceptions are affirmative defenses;
therefore, the "employer bears the burden of proof that conditions for the
exceptions have been met." 97 An employer relying on one of these defenses
"shall give as much notice as is practicable and at that time shall give a
brief statement of the basis for reducing the notification period."98 But once
the employer has met its burden of proving one of these conditions as a
defense, the employer's liability is reduced. In other words, the very real
and tangible effects of the unforeseeable business circumstance, the
company's faltering financial condition, and the natural disaster are borne
not by the employer, who arguably is in a better position to bear those
burdens, at least with respect to the unforeseeable business circumstances
and faltering company exceptions. Rather, those burdens are borne by the
workers. 99
The WARN Act does require employers to give notice to employees
regardless of whether those employees are unionized. In particular, the
WARN Act requires employers to notify "each representative of the
affected employees . . . or, if there is no such representative at that time, to
each affected employee." 10 0 In that way, the WARN Act potentially covers
many more employees than other federal statutes, such as the NLRA and
the Railway Labor Act, the purpose of which are to protect union
employees in these circumstances. But as shown below, the rights
conferred on employees protected under the NLRA are much more

extensive. 101

97. 20 C.F.R.

§ 639.9

(2009); see In re APA Transp. Corp. Consol. Litig., 541 F.3d 233, 248 (3d

Cir. 2008).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(3) (2006).
99. Arnow-Richman, supra note 38 (critiquing the unforeseen business circumstances defense on
similar grounds and arguing that where unforeseen circumstances preclude advance notice to
employees, employers should be required to pay severance instead).
100. Id. at (a)(1). Under the WARN Act, the employee representative of unionized workers is the
exclusive representative of employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006) or id. § 158(f), or the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2006); see 20 C.F.R.
§ 639.3(d) (2009) (clarifying the statutory term, "representative"); see also United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 548-50 (1996) (holding that the WARN
Act authorizes unions to sue for damages on behalf of their employee members and that unions have
standing to bring a WARN action on behalf of their members).
101. For purposes of this article, I focus exclusively on the rights conferred upon employees under
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006).
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c. The NLRA's Negotiation Solution: Information Requests Coupled with
Decisional and Effects Bargaining
i. Introduction
The NLRA forbids employers from discharging employees because of
their union activity. 10 2 In that way, the NLRA's discrimination provision
can be viewed as a federal exception to the at-will doctrine. But while the
question whether an employer may discriminate against employees because
of their union activity implicates the job security of those employees
harmed by an employer's union animus, it does not present the question of
economic job security. Suppose instead that an employer discharges
employees not because of their union activity, or out of union animus, or
even because they have engaged in activity protected under Section 7 of the
NLRA. Imagine instead that the employer of a unionized workforce simply
wants or needs to lay off employees. What protections does the NLRA
offer those unionized employees?
The answer to that question generally turns on the construction of
NLRA Section 8(a)(5) as interpreted by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) and reviewing appellate courts. The answer to that question
also depends on the context in which the layoffs arise; for example,
whether the layoffs were part of a plant closing, a subcontracting
arrangement, or under a collective-bargaining agreement, just to name a
few of the most significant circumstances under which this question may
arise. The answers to those questions are reviewed below.
ii. The Duty to Bargain Means the Mutual Obligation to Bargain in Good
Faith with a View Toward Reaching an Agreement
Section 7 of the NLRA grants employees "the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection."10 3 NLRA Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair
labor practice for employers "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of [their] employees."1 0 4 NLRA Section 8(a)(1) makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce

102. Id. §§ 157, 158(a)(3) and (1).
103. Id. § 157.
104. Id. § 158(a)(5).
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employees in the exercise of [their Section 7 rights]."105
NLRA Section 8(d) defines the duty to bargain collectively as
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached if requested by either party.106

The duty to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession."1 0 7
Section 8(d) defines the contours of the statutory duty to bargain,
which limits mandatory bargaining "to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment."' 0 8 The Supreme Court has defined these
mandatory subjects of bargaining as those matters that are "plainly
germane to the 'working environment""1 09 and "not among those
'managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control." 10
The Court has further observed that the matters that are subject to
mandatory bargaining are numerous."' Mandatory subjects broadly
include, among other things, overtime and other pay,11 2 bonuses,1 3
pensions and other employee benefits,11 4 wage increases," 5 work schedules

105. Id. at (a)(1).
106. Id. at (d). See generally Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain, 83
GEO. L.J. 19 (1994) For a discussion of the good faith requirement, see Archibald Cox, The Duty To
Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1401 (1958).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); see H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970) (holding that
although the NLRA authorizes the NLRB to require employers and unions to negotiate, "it is without
power to compel a company or a union to agree to any substantive contractual provision of a collective
bargaining agreement"); NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 487 (1960) (interpreting
Section 8(d) as "an attempt by Congress to prevent the Board from controlling the settling of the terms
of collective bargaining agreements"); NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952)
(clarifying that "the Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in
judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements").
108. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
109. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 498 (1979) (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
110. Id. at 498 (quoting FibreboardPaperProds. Corp., 379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
111. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 199 (1991). For a comprehensive list and
discussion of mandatory subjects of bargaining see JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW 1263-1361 (5th ed. 2006).
112. Equitable Res. Energy Co., 307 N.L.R.B. 730, 733, enforced, 989 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1993).
113. NLRB v. Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F.2d 974, 978-79 (8th Cir. 1967) (bonus plan that was
part of company's compensation structure is a mandatory bargaining subject); Union Mfg. Co., 76
N.L.R.B. 322, 324 (1948) (bonuses and vacations).
114. Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, 4-8 (1948) (pension and retirement plans), enforced, 179 F.2d
247, 251-55 (7th Cir. 1948).
115. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 737-40 (1962) (general wage levels and merit wage increases);
NLRB v. J.H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766, 768 (6th Cir. 1948) (merit wage increases).
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including working hours and work day, 1 16 work assignments, 1 17
seniority, 118
promotions, 119 transfers, 120 dress code, 121 work and discipline rules, 1 22
health and safety rules,1 2 3 drug testing policies, 12 4 and grievance and
arbitration procedures. 12 5 To paraphrase Professor Summers, that means
that, if the union wants to talk about these subjects, the employer is
obligated to bargain with the majority union to impasse in good faith with a
view toward reaching agreement.12 6
iii. The NLRA Does Not Require Employers to Bargain over the Decision
to Close a Plant but Employers Are Required to Bargain over the Effects of
that Decision
More pertinent to the question whether the NLRA protects the job
security of unionized employees is the following: Although layoff
practices 27 and subcontractingl28 are mandatory subjects of bargaining, the
116. Local Union No. 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965) (working hours and
workdays: "[T]he particular hours of the day and the particular days of the week during which
employees shall be required to work are subjects within the realm of 'wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment' about which employers and unions must bargain"); Gallenkamp Stores Co.
v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 525, 529 n.4 (9th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Bonham Cotton Mills, Inc., 289 F.2d 903,
904 (5th Cir. 1961) (workloads).
117. Essex Valley Visiting Nurses Ass'n, 343 N.L.R.B. 817, 817 (2004) (transferring four nurses
from one position to another).
118. Nev-Tun, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 138, 140 (1993) (seniority system); Oliver Corp., 162 N.L.R.B.
813, 814 (1967) (terms and conditions of employment of probationary employees).
119. Amalgamated Transit Union Int'l v. Donovan, 767 F.2d 939, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (promotion
of bargaining unit employees); Kohler Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1580, 1583 (1985) (promotions and
reclassification of bargaining-unit jobs to nonunit jobs).
120. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1974) (transfer of six employees from one
office to another office at a different location).
121. Crittenton Hosp., 342 N.L.R.B. 686, 686-87 (2004) (dress code mandatory subject but
employer's unilateral change not sufficiently "material, substantial, and significant" to constitute an
unfair labor practice).
122. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 737-40 (1962) (sick leave policy); Winter Garden Citrus Prods.
Coop. v. NLRB, 238 F.2d 128, 129 (5th Cir. 1956) (work rules relating to smoking, talking on the job,
coffee breaks, workloads).
123. NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 1967) (plant safety rules and practices
are mandatory subjects).
124. Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180, 181 (1989) (drug and alcohol testing).
125. See, e.g., NLRB v. Indep. Stave Co., 591 F.2d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1979) (grievance
procedures); United Elec. Radio & Machine Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 150, 156-57 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (arbitrations).
126. Indep. Stave Co., 591 F.2d at 446; United Elec. Radio & Machine Workers ofAm., 409 F.2d at
156-57; Lofaso Lecture Notes, supra note 10, at Jan. 31, 1989.
127. NLRB v. Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F.2d 974, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1967) (layoff practices are
mandatory subjects).
128. Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964) (concluding that "the
replacement of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do
the same work under similar conditions of employment" is a mandatory bargaining subject); Airo Die
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decision to close a plantl29 is not a mandatory subject. In particular, in
Textile Workers v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., - a case that "echos
MacKay Radio"'3 0 - the Supreme Court held that "an employer has an
absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases"
even if that reason is union animus.131 The Court went on to conclude that
an employer does, however, violate Section 8(a)(3) when it closes part of
its business because of union animus - because that decision can be used to
intimidate the remaining workers by threatening their job security. The
Court left open the question whether an employer's decision to close part
of its business for economic reasons without bargaining would violate
Section 8(a)(5).
In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,1 32 the Court answered
that question, concluding that the management decision to shut part of its
company's business for purely economic reasons was not, under the facts
of that case, a mandatory subject of bargaining. The Court recognized the
union's legitimate "interest in participating in the decision to close a
particular facility or part of an employer's operations [as rooted in] its
legitimate concern over job security."1 33 But it nonetheless held that "an
employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of
its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit
that might be gained through the union's participation in making the
decision."1 34 The Court further held that "the decision itself [to close a
plant] is not part of §8(d)'s 'terms and conditions' . . . over which Congress
has mandated bargaining."1 35
Thus, the test used for determining whether a subject is a management
prerogative or a mandatory subject of bargaining is not whether the subject
touches upon employment terms or conditions, as the plain language of the
NLRA would suggest. Rather, the Court concluded,
in view of an employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking,
bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on
the continued availability of employment should be required only if the
benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining
Casting, Inc., 354 N.L.R.B. No. 8, *2 (Apr. 29, 2009) (subcontracting bargaining unit work is a
mandatory bargaining subject); Long Beach Press-Telegram & S. Cal. Media Guild, 354 N.L.R.B. No.
4, *3 (Apr. 28, 2009) (subcontracting bargaining unit work and reductions in force).
129. Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965).
130. Lofaso Lecture Notes, supra note 10, at Apr. 4, 1989 (explaining that the decision runs
counter to the NLRA's plain language).

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

380 U.S. at 268.
452 U.S. 666 (1981).
Id. at 681.
Id. at 686.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.136

The Court so concluded even though it found "past instances where unions
have aided employers in saving failing businesses by lending technical
assistance, reducing wages and benefits or increasing production, and even
loaning part of earned wages to forestall closures."1 3 7 Despite such
instances, and despite the "open-endedness" of the NLRA's plain language,
the Court based its conclusion on its own bald assertion that "Congress had
no expectation that the elected union representative would become an equal
partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the union's
members are employed."138 That assertion reveals the Court's
misunderstanding of bargaining's role in such cases. The Court
fundamentally confused bargaining with co-determination.
The Court also seemed persuaded by the policy argument that
imposing on employers a duty to bargain over plant closing decisions
would give unions an unfair advantage in the bargaining process: "Labeling
this type of decision mandatory could afford a union a powerful tool for
achieving delay, a power that might be used to thwart management's
intentions in a manner unrelated to any feasible solution the union might
propose."l 39
The Court's reasoning confused the union's role as workers' advocate
in times of industrial peace with the union's economic power wielded in
times of economic warfare. The point at which an employer is considering
shutting down part of its facility is a point at which the employer and the
workers share a mutual interest to ensure profitability. The union has no
interest in harming a business whose life it needs to sustain its members. 140
That is a very different role that the union plays in cases where negotiations
have broken down and in response to the declaration of impasse, the union
and its workers strike in a show of economic force designed to move the
employer off its bargaining position.
In an attempt to "undo" this perceived harm, the Court in an act of
judicial activism compounded its error by violating the NLRA's plain
language and reading into the statute subjects over which employers need
"unencumbered decisionmaking." In so holding, the Court not only did
violence to the NLRA's plain language, but also ignored the NLRA's main
136. Id. at 679.
137. Id. at 681 n.19.
138. Id. at 676.
139. Id. at 683.
140. Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistenceof Union Repression in an Era of Recognition, 62 ME. L.
REV. - (forthcoming 2010) (discussing this very same confusion in the Bush II Board's recent
September Massacre cases, especially Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 225, 231 (2007)).
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purposes - to equalize bargaining power and to prevent industrial strife.
The Court's decision, which gives employees no voice, no outlet, and no
choice, makes industrial strife much more likely. 141
iv. The NLRA Requires Employers to Bargain with Unions over the
Effects of Their Decisions to Close Plants
The question whether a topic is subject to mandatory bargaining is
plainly very significant. Employers must bargain over mandatory subjects.
As the Court long ago recognized,
A refusal to negotiate in fact as to any subject which is within §8(d), and
about which the union seeks to negotiate, violates §8(a)(5) though the
employer has every desire to reach agreement with the union upon an
overall collective agreement and earnestly and in all good faith bargains
to that end. 142
That means that employers may not make unilateral changes to mandatory
subjects without bargaining to impasse. As the Court has insightfully
explained, "an employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment
under negotiation is . . . a violation of §8(a)(5), for it is a circumvention of
the duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of §8(a)(5) much as
does a flat refusal" to negotiate. 143
By contrast, absent prior agreement, an employer may lawfully
change, without notice to or bargaining with the union, matters that are not
subject to mandatory bargaining. The logical extension of this doctrine
seems to suggest that, absent some other doctrine, employers may
unilaterally close plants without first talking to unions. But this is not
completely accurate.
It is well settled that, although an employer is not obligated to bargain
with a majority union over the decision to shut down a plant, it is obligated
to bargain over the effects of that decision. 144 Effects bargaining must be
meaningful; unions are entitled to "as much notice of [a] closing and
termination of employees as [is] needed for meaningful bargaining at a
meaningful time." 145 Accordingly, "[n]otice on the day of closing is
insufficient to give the Union an opportunity to bargain regarding the

141. See generally RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984);
ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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142. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).
143. Id.
144. First Nat'1 Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 n.15 (1981).
145. Willamette Tug & Barge Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 282, 283 (1990); accordNLRB v. Compact Video
Servs., Inc., 121 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 1997).
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effects of the closing."1 4 6 The duty to engage in "effects bargaining"
remains even after the plant has closed.1 4 7
v. The NLRA also Requires Employers to Furnish Relevant Information to
Unions
It is well settled that an employer's duty to bargain in good faith with
the majority union "includes a duty to provide relevant information needed
by a labor union for the proper performance of its duties as the employees'
bargaining representative."I 4 8 This duty includes the duty to furnish
information relevant to negotiations. 149 An employer's failure to furnish
relevant information upon request is viewed as "conflict[ing] with the
statutory policy to facilitate effective collective bargaining." 150
The employer's duty to produce information is triggered if the
information is relevant.15 1 In determining whether requested information is
relevant, the NLRB need only find a "probability that the desired
information [is] relevant, and that it would be of use to the union in
carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities." 1 52 The standard for
determining whether information is relevant to the union's bargaining
obligations is a liberal "discovery-type standard." 153 "A broad disclosure
rule is crucial to full development of the role of collective bargaining"
under the NLRA because "[u]nless each side has access to information
enabling it to discuss intelligently and deal meaningfully with bargainable
issues, effective negotiations cannot occur." 1 5 4
Information sought in furtherance of effects bargaining is
presumptively relevant. As reviewing courts have observed, certain
information is considered "so intrinsic to the core of the employeremployee relationship as to be presumptively relevant."1 55 And
146. Asher Candy, Inc. v. NLRB, 258 F. App'x 334, 334 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
147. United Food & Commercial Workers v. NLRB, 519 F.3d 490, 495-96 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
148. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979); see also NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co.,
385 U.S. 432, 435-37 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956).
149. For example, an employer's refusal to furnish information to substantiate an inability to pay
violates the duty to bargain. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. at 152.
150. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. NLRB 603 F.2d 1310, 1315 (8th Cir. 1979).
151. Emeryville Res. Ctr. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1971).
152. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. at 437; see also Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic Commc'ns
Union v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (information is relevant if it is germane and "has
any bearing on the subject matter of the case").
153. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. at 437 (citing 4 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE §§ 26.16(1), 1175-76, 1181 (2d ed. undated)).
154. Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic Commc'ns Union, 598 F.2d at 271 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(information is relevant if it is "germane" or if it "has any bearing on the subject matter of the case"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
155. Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 18,24 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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"[i]nformation directly relevant to mandatory subjects of bargaining is
'presumptively relevant,' and must therefore be disclosed unless it is
plainly irrelevant."1 56
The duty to furnish information is vital to meaningful effects
bargaining. After all, the union is under an obligation to bargain over the
effects of a plant closing, which necessarily means the effects of job loss.
As the Court observed in the context of an employer's asserted inability to
pay a wage increase, "[g]ood-faith bargaining necessarily requires that
claims made by either bargainer should be honest claims."l 57 This
observation is no less true in the context of a plant closing, especially
where the employer may be claiming economic reasons for closing the
plant and the likely subjects on the bargaining table would include
severance pay.
d. A Comparative Look at the Consultation Requirement Under the
European Collective Redundancies Directive: Consulting with Workers'
Representatives with a View to Reaching an Agreement
The European Union has taken a more cooperative approach to
resolving problems associated with mass economic dismissals. In
legislation that values "talk," the European Union expresses both its
concern with painting a human face on its integrated economic system
while also maintaining a competitive trading block in this increasingly
global economy.
The first employment laws to come out of the European Union
(EU)158 can be traced to the 1972 Declaration of the Heads of State or
Government in Paris, in which the EU Member States declared that they
"attached as much importance to vigorous action in the social field as to the
achievement of economic union . . . [and thus] it is essential to ensure the
increased involvement of labour and management in the economic and
social decisions of the Community."1 5 9 The 1972 declaration led directly to
156. Equitable Gas Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 980, 993 (3d Cir. 1981).
157. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956).
158. At the time, the EU was known as the European Economic Community (EEC). Moreover, the
EEC has had several names, including the European Community (EC), depending upon which treaty is
in effect and other conditions. For simplicity's sake, I refer to the EEC and the EC as the EU
throughout.
159.

RUTH NIELSEN & ERIKA SZYSZCZAK, THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 25

(3d ed. 1997) (quoting a communiqu6 from the Member States) (internal quotation marks omitted). See
generally MICHAEL SHANKS, EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY, TODAY AND TOMORROW (1977); Juliet

Lodge, Towards a Human Union: EEC Social Policy and European Integration, 4 BRIT. J. INT'L STUD.
107 (1978).
This social face being painted on Europe also had its roots in the European Court of Justice's
(ECJ) interpretation of Treaty of Rome Article 119, which declared in part that "[e]ach Member State

2010]1

TALKING IS WORTHWHILE

83

the EU's first Social Action Programme - the Social Action Programme of
1974 (SAP 1974).160 Three (economic) employment directivesl61 were the
direct result of the SAP 1974.162
Based on those three original employment directives, the European
Union (EU) now regulates to some extent workers' rights in three types of
circumstances involving economic dismissals: collective redundancies;1 6 3
business reorganizations and transfers;164 and insolvency. 165 In this article,
my analysis focuses on the Collective Redundancies Directive.
The Collective Redundancies Directive was the first of the SAP 1974
economic proposals to obtain the force of law. In 1975, the European
shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men
and women should receive equal pay for equal work." Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community art. 119, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Rome Treaty]. Accordingly, in
Defrenne v. Sabena, the ECJ explained that Article 119 "forms part of the social objectives of the
Community, which is not merely an economic union, but is at the same time intended, by common
action, to ensure social progress and seek the constant improvement of the living and working
conditions of [the European people]." Case 43/75, 1976 ECR 455, 1 10.
160. Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 Concerning a Social Action Programme, 1974 O.J. (C
13) 1.
161. In the European Union, a directive is a legislative act of either the European Council or the
Commission, addressed to member states (as opposed to individuals), that are binding as to their result.
Directives generally impose a duty on the member states to ensure that the directive is translated into
the member state's domestic law. Legal persons with standing may sue under the directive in the
European Court of Justice. For a thorough explanation of the various legal powers under the European
Union, see Lofaso, supra note 3, at 478-81.
162. Council Resolution, supra note 160. SAPs are "launched periodically by the [European]
Commission to promote the EU's social objectives." Eurofound, Social Action Programme, <http://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/socialactionprogramme.htm>
(last viewed Jan. 26, 2010).
163. Collective Redundancies Directive, supra note 8.
164. Council Directive 77/187, 1977 O.J. (L 061) 26 (EEC), amended by Council Directive 98/50,
1998 O.J. (L 201) 88 (EC), consolidated in Council Directive 2001/23, 2001 O.J. (L 082) 16 (EC)
[hereinafter Acquired Rights Directive]. The Acquired Rights Directive aims to ensure that workers'
terms and conditions of employment are unaffected by a business transfer or merger. See Council
Directive 2001/23, art. 1, 2001 O.J. (L 082) 16, 16 (EC) (defining scope of directive as applying to "any
transfer of an undertaking, business, or part of an undertaking or business to another employer as a
result of a legal transfer or merger"). See generally John Armour & Simon Deakin, Insolvency and
Employment Protection: The Mixed Effects of the Acquired Rights Directive, 22 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN.
443 (2002). The areas of labor law most analogous to this directive are the NLRB's alter ego doctrine
(Radio & Television Broad. Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965);
Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942) (discussing alter ego doctrine)) and
sucessorship doctrine (see, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987)
(holding that a successor's duty to bargain attaches when the successor has hired a substantial and
representative complement workforce); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972)
(holding that employers violate NLRA § 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain with legal successors to a
business but are not obliged to observe the terms of their predecessors collective-bargaining
agreement)), both of which are beyond the scope of this article.
165. Council Directive 80/987, 1980 O.J. (L 283) 23 (EEC), amended by Council Directive
2002/74, 2002 O.J. (L 270) 10 (EC). This directive aims to protect workers in case of employer
insolvency. The areas of U.S. law most analogous to this directive are the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1532 (2006), and how it interacts with labor laws, such as the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006).
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Economic Community (as it was then known) enacted the Collective
Redundancies Directive. Since that time, the Directive has been amended
and then consolidated as recently as 1998.
The current version of the Directive applies to collective
redundancies, defined as
(a). . . dismissals effected by an employer for one or more reasons not
related to the individual workers concerned where, according to the
choice of the Member States, the number of redundancies is:
(i) either, over a period of 30 days:
- at least 10 in establishments normally employing more than 20
and less than 100 workers,
- at least 10 percent of the number of workers in establishments
normally employing at least 100 but less than 300 workers,
- at least 30 in establishments normally employing 300 workers or
more,
(ii) or, over a period of 90 days, at least 20, whatever the number of
workers normally employed in the establishments in question.166
By defining "collective redundancies" in this exclusive manner, the
Collective Redundancies Directive, just like the WARN Act, exempts small
businesses from coverage. But coverage under the Collective Redundancies
Directive is potentially broader. Businesses employing at least twenty
workers are potentially covered by the Directive. By contrast, the WARN
Act potentially places duties only on businesses employing at least 100
workers. 167
Moreover, like the WARN Act, the protections provided by the
Collective Redundancies Directive are triggered by mass dismissals. But
once again, the coverage under the Collective Redundancies Directive is
broader because those protections are triggered by a lower threshold. For
example, in a business that employs 100 workers, the Collective
Redundancies Directive protects workers if that employer lays off ten
workers over a thirty-day period. 16 8 By contrast, that same employer in the
United States would not have any duties under the WARN Act until it had
laid off at least thirty-four workers over a thirty-day period or had closed a
plant in which at least fifty full-time workers had been laid off. 16 9
As a matter of the substantive nature of the rights granted in both
jurisdictions, the Collective Redundancies Directive requires almost
166. Collective Redundancies Directive, supra note 8, art. 1.
167. Compare the WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1) (2006), and 20 C.F.R.
with Collective Redundancies Directive, supra note 8, art. 1.
168. Collective Redundancies Directive, supra note 8, art. 1.
169. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101(a)(1)(A), 2101(a)(3)(A)(I), 2102 (2006).

§ 639.3(a)

(2009)
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everything required by U.S. federal labor law and more. As shown below,
the Directive starts with the premise that employers are compelled to
discuss the possibility of redundancies prior to making a decision about
redundancies. The Directive further compels employers to notify the
competent public authority and the workers' representatives about
projected redundancies for the purpose of seeking solutions to the problems
raised by the possibility of the redundancies. To make discussions
meaningful, the notification must contain all relevant information. In this
way, unlike U.S. federal laws, which resist dislodging the decision to layoff
from residing within the core entrepreneurial control of management, the
Collective Redundancies Directive takes a more labor-management
cooperative approach to the layoff decision and its effects.
Unlike the WARN Act, which requires employers to give employees
(or their representatives) advance notice of a mass layoff or plant closing
that has already been decided by management, and unlike the NLRA,
which requires employers to bargain with employee representatives over
the effects of a plant closing or at best the decision to lay off unionized
employees in some very limited circumstances, the Collective
Redundancies Directive requires consultation with the workers'
representatives prior to a decision being made. 17 0 Directive article 2(1)
provides:
Where an employer is contemplating collective redundancies, he shall
begin consultations with the workers' representatives in good time with a
view to reaching an agreement.17 1
The obligations placed on employers are significant in two ways. First
and significantly, the Collective Redundancies Directive places on
employers a duty to consult "with a view to reaching an agreement." 7 2
Given the Directive's language choice, this consultation right seems to be
at least coextensive with the federal right to bargain under the National
Labor Relations Act and perhaps even greater than the right granted under
the NLRA. Federal courts interpreting NLRA Section 8(d)'s definition of
the bargaining duty173 have made clear that the duty to bargain does not
include the duty to come to agreement.1 7 4 Perhaps this is why Professor
170. Case C-188/03, Junk v. Kiihnel, 2005 E.C.R. 1-885.
171. Collective Redundancies Directive, supra note 8, art. 2.
172. Id.
173. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
174. See H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970) (holding that although the NLRA
authorizes the NLRB to require employers and unions to negotiate, "it is without power to compel a
company or a union to agree to any substantive contractual provision of a collective bargaining
agreement"); NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 487 (1960) (interpreting Section 8(d) as
"an attempt by Congress to prevent the Board from controlling the settling of the terms of collective
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Summers, in describing the duty to bargain under Section 8(d) always
referred to it as obligating the parties to bargain in good faith with "a view
toward reaching agreement." The use of the preposition "toward" suggests
a duty to come close to agreement but not a duty to close the deal.
Second and also significantly is the timing of the duties in the two
jurisdictions. Under the Collective Redundancies Directive, the duty to
consult is triggered not once the decision to layoff is afait accompli but is
"imposed on the employer . . . prior to the employer's decision to terminate

employment contracts."l 75 In particular, the "consultation procedure must
be started by the employer once a strategic or commercial decision
compelling him to contemplate or to plan for collective redundancies has
been taken."l 76 By contrast, under federal law, the duty to notify or bargain
typically is imposed once a decision is made. And the duty to supply
relevant information under federal labor law is imposed upon request by
the union.
Article 2(2) of the Directive once again highlights that the imposed
duties are triggered prior to any decision being made. The Directive does
this by fleshing out the required subjects of discussion during
consultations:
These consultations shall, at least, cover ways and means of avoiding
collective redundancies or reducing the number of workers affected, and
of mitigating the consequences by recourse to accompanying social
measures aimed, inter alia, at aid for redeploying or retraining workers
made redundant.17 7

-

The Directive thereby promotes bringing the affected parties together in an
effort to find a social solution to an economic problem, by forcing
employers and employee representatives to discuss ways to avoid or reduce
the redundancies and ways to mitigate the accompanying social and
economic consequences of redundancies.
Article 2(3) of the Directive also attempts to ensure that these
discussions are meaningful and productive by ensuring that the workers'
representatives have ample time and ability to make constructive proposals.
The Directive does this in much the same way that federal labor law does
by compelling the employer "during the course of the consultations" to

bargaining agreements"); NLRB v. Am. Nat'1 Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952) (clarifying that "the
Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the
substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements").
175. Case C-44/08, Akavan Erityisalojen Keskusliitto v. Fujitsu Siemens Computers Oy, 2009 ECR
, 2009 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 747, ¶ 38 (Sept. 10, 2009).
176. Id.¶48.
177. Collective Redundancies Directive, supra note 8, art. 2.
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provide the workers with "all relevant information." 7 8 The Directive also
requires the employer "during the course of the consultations . .. [to] notify
[the workers' representatives] in writing of:
(i) the reasons for the projected redundancies;
(ii) the number of categories of workers to be made redundant;
(iii) the number and categories of workers normally employed;
(iv) the period over which the projected redundancies are to be
effected;
(v) the criteria proposed for the selection of the workers to be made
redundant in so far as national legislation and/or practice confers
the power therefore upon the employer;
(vi) the method for calculating any redundancy payments other than
those arising out of national legislation and/or practice. 17 9
To use federal labor jargon, the European Union has effectively made this
information per se relevant. Such information provides a useful starting
point for the workers' representatives to begin meaningful consultation
about avoiding or mitigating potential layoffs.
Like the WARN Act, the Collective Redundancies Directive also has a
notification requirement. In particular, the Collective Redundancies
Directive requires employers to "notify the competent public authority in
writing of any projected collective redundancies" and to "forward to the
workers' representatives a copy of [that] notification." 8 0 The purpose of
the notification period is for the "competent public authority to seek
solutions to the problems raised by the projected collective
redundancies." 18 1 The notification period may not be any shorter than thirty
days; but in cases where the notification period is less than sixty days,
"Member States may grant the competent public authority the power to
extend the initial period to 60 days following notification where the
problems raised by the projected collective redundancies are not likely to
be solved within the initial period."1 82
There is no analogous requirement under the NLRA. Unlike the
Directive, which expressly authorizes the competent public authority "to
seek solutions" to the effects of the projected layoffs, construction of the
NLRA has evolved in a way that generally forbids the public agency - the

"

178. "To enable workers' representatives to make constructive proposals, the employers shall in
good time during the course of the consultations .. . (a) supply them with all relevant information ....
Id., art. 2.
179. Id., art. 3.

180. Id.
181.

Id.,art.4.

182. Id.
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NLRB - from injecting itself into the bargaining process. That distinction
is significant. In the United States, absent extreme circumstances,
collective bargaining is viewed as an act between employers and the
employees' bargaining representatives. The European Union, by contrast,
values the public interest in these matters - a value that is often overlooked
under federal labor law.
IV. BORROWING FROM THE COLLECTIVE REDUNDANCIES DIRECTIVE TO
MAKE BARGAINING OVER ECONOMIC JOB Loss MORE MEANINGFUL

-

This article examines how two jurisdictions have attempted to solve
the problem of economic dismissals. One jurisdiction - U.S. federal law
mandates bargaining in good faith with a view toward reaching an
agreement over the effects of the decision (and perhaps, in limited
circumstances such as subcontracting away bargaining unit work, the
decision itself). Federal law mandates such bargaining but only in
circumstances where the employees are actually represented by a labor
union. In cases where employees are unrepresented, federal law merely
requires advance notification of layoff or plant closing. The other
jurisdiction - the European Union - mandates employers to consult with
the workers' representatives before any decision is made and with a view to
reaching an agreement. And significantly, where the employees are
unrepresented, the European Union still requires the employer to consult
with the workers by requiring the member states to amend their domestic
laws to ensure representation in these circumstances. 18 3 Both jurisdictions
require employers to furnish information relevant to the bargaining process.
This was the problem that I told Professor Summers I wanted to think
about as a graduate student in England. What is the law's role in regulating
mass economic dismissals? For Professor Summers, the answer would have
to be to protect the individual against collective coercion. For him, the
answer would lie in minimizing the role of government by maximizing the
role of collective bargaining. In my view, as influenced by my great
mentor, the solution must enhance the autonomy and raise the dignity of
the workers. 184 In particular, for me, any solution would necessarily need to
enhance worker autonomy by: ensuring employees are sufficiently
educated to properly represent themselves; granting employees access to
relevant information sufficient for employees to generate a range of
options; ensuring employee independence from coercion; and providing

183. Case C-382/93, Comm'n v. United Kingdom, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2479.
184. My theory on how to do this can be found at Lofaso, supra note 1.
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sufficient democratic (participatory) structure to empower workers to effect
the necessary changes. 185 Any solution would also have to dignify workers
by treating each worker with "'equal concern and respect in the design and
administration of the . . . institutions that govern them."'1 8 6 Those views,
Summers' pragmatic and mine more theoretical, land on the same solution:
Require employers to bargain in good faith with a view to[ward] reaching
agreement before any decision to lay off workers has been made.
Of course, this leaves the United States with the same problem that the
United Kingdom claimed that it had when, in Commission v. United
Kingdom, 1 it argued that the Collective Redundancies Directive did not
apply to unorganized workforces. When the European Court of Justice
felled that argument, it compelled the UK to amend its trade union laws
and the structure of its system of collective representation in a manner that
shook the British people.1 88 Since that time, the UK has amended its laws
to require employers to consult with "appropriate representatives" of
employees who may be affected by a collective redundancy. Appropriate
representatives are: "(a) if the employees are of a description in respect of
which an independent trade union is recognised by the employer,
representatives of the trade union, or (b) . . . employee representatives
elected by them."' 89
The UK experience tells us that, although Congress could enact
legislation based on the Collective Redundancies Directive, the fight would
be in providing a mechanism for universal representation, at least on
universal representation for purposes of bargaining over mass economic
dismissals. Nevertheless, that is precisely what I would recommend. The
simplest solution, in my view, is to amend the WARN Act to compel
employers to consult with or bargain with employees' representatives over
mass layoffs or plant closings with a view toward reaching agreement. In
that case, it could define employees' representatives as the UK did: (a)
elected by employees designated for possible layoff; (b) unless the
employees are represented by a union, in which case, the workers'
representatives to be consulted would be the majority union. The problem
with this solution (the UK solution) is the following: in the case of the

185. Id. at 40-42.
186. Id. at 49 (quoting RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 181 (1977) and citing JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 504-12 (1972)).

187. Case C-382/93, Comm'n v. United Kingdom, 1994 ECR 1-2479.
188. Paul Davies, A Challenge to Single Channel, 23 INDUS. L.J. 272 (1994) (reporting on the
Commission v. United Kingdom cases).
189. Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment)
(Amendment) Regulations, 1999, S.I. 1999/1925 (U.K.).
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unorganized workforce, it provides bargaining representatives with very
little time to organize themselves in preparation for meaningful bargaining.
Indeed, that group may be rather diverse and have very little in common
(other than foreseeable job loss) that would permit meaningful bargaining
as would ordinarily be required by federal labor law's community of
interest test. 190
An alternative to the UK solution might be to amend the NLRA to
mandate certain forms of worker organizations for specific purposes - an
ad hoc bargaining committee of sorts. The mechanisms for electing fullrange majority bargaining representatives would remain intact under
Section 9.191 And the practice of voluntary recognition can remain intact.192
But the newly amended NLRA would also require every statutory
employer to voluntarily recognize an ad hoc bargaining committee for
purposes of bargaining over mass economic dismissals. The NLRB would
have to issue regulations regarding selection of these committees. And
because the committee would be long-standing, the NLRB might have to
issue regulations regarding re-selection of the committee every year or so.
In cases where the parties could not agree, the parties would have to submit
their question concerning representation to the NLRB for review and
possibly for a Board-conducted election.
This labor-inspired solution has the benefit of enhancing worker
autonomy, at least insofar as it grants employees access to relevant
information sufficient for employees to generate a range of options and
provides sufficient participatory structure to empower workers to effect the
190. In defining appropriate bargaining units, the Board "focus is on whether the employees share a
community of interest."' NLRB v. Action Auto., Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 494 (1985) (citing S. Prairie
Constr. Co. v. Operating Eng'rs, 425 U.S. 800, 805 (1976) (per curiam)); see id. at 494-99 (Board did
not abuse its discretion in excluding wife of company president and part-owner of company from
bargaining unit). The unit need not be the most appropriate. See Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S.
606, 610 (1991) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988)).
In determining whether the requisite community of interest exists, the Board considers several
criteria, no single factor alone being determinative. The factors include:
(a) geographic proximity of the stores in relation to each other;
(b) level of employee interchange between various stores;
(c) degree of autonomy exercised by the local store manager, especially with respect to
labor relations;
(d) extent of union organization;
(e) history of collective bargaining;
(f) desires of the affected employees;
(g) employer's organizational framework;
(h) similarity in skills, employee benefits, wages and hours of work.
Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. NLRB, 705 F.2d 570, 575-76 (1st Cir. 1983).

191. 29 U.S.C.

§ 159(a) (2006).

192. In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 437-42 (2007) (amending Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157
N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966)).

2010]

TALKING IS WORTHWHILE

91I

changes necessary to circumvent or reduce layoffs. 1 9 3 It also dignifies
workers by allowing them to participate in a decision affecting their work
life. But it has the potential problem of undercutting union representation
more generally, which may have the unintended consequence of
diminishing overall worker autonomy and de-dignifying other workers.
Accordingly, this solution may work best if broadened - a subject for a
future paper.
A third alternative, which I do not recommend, is to allow the
employer to choose the representatives. The problem with this solution is
that does very little to enhance worker autonomy or dignity to the extent
that the committee becomes merely a tool for management. Moreover, such
a committee would likely violate Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA. 19 4 Indeed,
just as Professor Summers pointed out in the replacement worker context of
MacKay Radio1 95 and again in the lockout context presented in American
Ship Building,19 6 that solution gets the incentives wrong because it allows
the employer to make a significant decision about the economic fate of its
workers in circumstances where the union is weak. That policy hardly
enhances the NLRA's goal of equalizing bargaining power, but rather
exacerbates the inequality of power between the employer and its
workers. 197
V. CONCLUSION

Late in the semester of my first-year labor law course, Professor
Summers, with the benefit of having taught that course under every
variation of the NLRA, including the Wagner Act itself, revealed his
assessment of twentieth-century labor law. In his view, the United States
had "adopted a system of free collective bargaining in the 1930s. But after
fifty years, we do not have a system of free collective bargaining that
touches 80 percent of the labor market. Overall, we have failed in the
purposes of the Wagner Act."1 98 Summers then asked: "What do you do
when you don't have collective bargaining?" Answering his own question,
he said,
lots of government regulation.... Collective bargaining [was] meant to
193. Lofaso, supra note 1, at 40-42.
194. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006) (forbidding employers from "dominat[ing] or interfer[ing] with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribut[ing] financial or other support to
it").
195. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
196. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
197. Lofaso Lecture Notes, supra note 10, at Jan. 31, 1989.
198. Id., at Mar. 2, 1989.
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solve problems but because collective bargaining has not done it . . now
it is being done by [statutory regulation]. Because 80 percent of the
people are not protected, even though all unions have provisions against
discharge without just cause, there are statutes that reiterate this. 199
So how do my proposed solutions fare under the Summers test? The
possibility of extending collective bargaining to more workers would likely
appeal to my mentor. But do any of those solutions protect the individual
from collective sources of coercion? The very question - how can the law
protect employees in the case of impending mass economic dismissals
lends itself to a Summers-like conclusion. After all, few events in workers'
lives are more coercive than being told that they are being terminated
through no fault of their own. The solution - allowing employees to
participate in discussions about impending mass layoffs with a view toward
circumventing, reducing, or mitigating those dismissals - both dignifies the
workers and allows them to become part authors of their work life. These
workers need not "follow or be out" to paraphrase Summers' view of the
typical worker's choice under an authoritarian employer in a unitarist
system of industrial relations.2 0 0 Instead, these solutions empower workers
to take control of their destinies by helping to save their jobs and the
businesses that employ them. By requiring employers to consult workers'
representatives in circumstances of possible layoffs, the law gives a "voice"
to employees. And, as Summers points out, "talking is worthwhile"
because it empowers workers by taking away power from employers, in
this case the power to unilaterally decide their fate. 2 0 1 My tribute to
Professor Summers then is to thank him for dignifying workers and for
believing that the working class is intelligent enough to participate fully in
decisions affecting our working lives.

199. Id.
200. Id., at Jan. 26, 1989.
201. Id., at Jan. 31, 1989.

